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Summary 
In this report, we investigate the expected effects of reducing the area in which live piglet transports 
are banned on transmission risk and on the piglet surplus (in the area of the transport ban) during a 
CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. In our analyses we consider the following effects resulting from a 
reduction of the area under piglet transport ban:  
• the additional transmission risk   
• the reduction of the piglet surplus 
• the financial costs and benefits  
In the present study, the area placed under animal transport ban in current contingency plans (i.e. 
whole regions, coloured red + yellow in Figure 1.2) is referred to as the default scenario. As a most 
extreme alternative scenario, we will investigate the consequences of only placing farms under the 
piglet transport ban which are located within a 10 km Protection and Surveillance zone (PS-zone) 
around a CSF-infected premise (IP). For both scenarios the risk will be expressed as the expected 
mean size of additional IPs in hitherto disease-free regions, caused by (1) transport of infected piglets 
from the red area to the green area in Figure 1.2, causing new IPs, and (2) the subsequent 
neighbourhood infections of these new IPs. Output of this epidemiological analysis will be used for 
the economic analysis of the two scenarios.  
The results, based on the model used before by Backer et al. (2013), were as follows. The mean 
number of infected transports in the country under the alternative scenario is 0.53 per CSF epidemic, 
causing the same number of (finisher) farms (0.53) infected by piglet transport. The total number of 
additional infected farms per epidemic has a mean value of 1.01 farms (with median value 0), when 
the normal frequency of one piglet transport per multiplier farm per week is applied. This reduces to 
a mean of 0.84 farms (with median value 0) at a lower piglet transport frequency of once every three 
weeks. 
The estimated number of additional infected farms must be compared to the mean epidemic size of 
CSF in the Netherlands under the default scenario, which equals 15.8 infected farms. So due to lifting 
the piglet transport ban in the red areas, the mean increase of the CSF epidemic size by 1.01 farms 
(assuming one piglet transport per week per multiplier farm) represents an increase of 6.4%. 
In addition to looking at the increase in total epidemic size, we can compare the number of 
transmission jumps in the country during a CSF epidemic. The mean number of jumps more than 50 
km away from the source farm increases from 0.21 under the default scenario to 0.74 per epidemic 
under the alternative scenario with a normal piglet transport frequency of once a week. In other 
words, this number increases by a factor 3.5 when lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas. 
However, the value of 0.74 jumps can be reduced by transporting piglets from farms in red areas as 
much as possible to farms in the same red areas, i.e. not to green areas further away.  
The number of farms with piglets located in the red areas to be screened (before their piglet 
transport) is very high, with mean values varying from 30-70 farms per working day during the first 8 
weeks of the epidemic. This number increases to 96 farms per working day at later stages of the 
epidemic, if red areas are not declared free from infection.  
  
4 
Model simulations revealed that the average number of piglets produced in infected areas but 
outside the 10 km PS-zone of infected premises amounted to 2.22 million after 119 days (given an 
epidemic in three specific regions 8, 18 and 19). Allowing transport in affected regions will reduce 
piglet surplus considerably. On average supply balances demands within affected regions, however in 
5% of the epidemics piglet surplus will exceed 0.28 million after 119 days. If besides allowing 
transport also permitted stocking density is temporarily increased (with 10% or 30%) or fattening 
period shortened (from 115 days to 100 days) supply will exceed demand in areas of interest.  
 
Easing the transport ban would increase the risk of transmission (i.e., larger epidemics) thereby 
increasing control and enforcement costs by 6.1 million Euro. Compared to other costing 
components the relative impact of an increased epidemic size is less relevant. The economic losses 
due to reduced revenues in infected areas (i.e., channelling and suboptimal value) are offset by the 
foregone costs of culling and destructing valuable products (i.e., welfare slaughter programme). 
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Chapter 1. Epidemiological evaluation of the extra transmission risk 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Background and research question 
Given the large number of piglets that need to move from multiplier to finisher farms, transport 
restrictions in certain areas affected by Classical Swine Fever (CSF) or Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) 
will lead to a piglet surplus problem (in those areas) during CSF or FMD epidemics.  
In this report, we investigate the expected effects of reducing the area in which live piglet transports 
are banned on transmission risk and the piglet surplus during a CSF epidemic in the Netherlands. 
Such a strategy would potentially be a way to reduce piglet surplus, improve animal welfare and 
decrease financial costs during an outbreak of CSF or FMD in the Netherlands. In our analyses we 
consider the following effects resulting from a reduction of the area under piglet transport ban:  
• the additional transmission risk   
• the reduction of the piglet surplus 
• the financial costs and benefits  
Currently, regions under transport ban are determined using a set of 20 geographical control 
regions1 as defined in the Dutch CSF contingency plan (Anon., 2013) and depicted in Figure 1.1. The 
region under transport ban is formed by those control regions which overlap with so-called 
Protection- and Surveillance-zones (PS-zones). A PS-zone is the combined area of the Surveillance 
zone of 10 km around an infected premise (IP) which encapsulates the Protection zone of 3 km 
around the same IP.  
 
Approach to answering the research question 
 
In the present study, this area placed under animal transport ban in current contingency plans 
(coloured red + yellow in Figure 1.2) is referred to as the default scenario. As a most extreme 
alternative scenario, we will investigate the consequences of only placing farms under the piglet 
transport ban which are located within a 10 km PS-zone around an IP. Thus, for the rest of that 
control region, extra financial costs will be prevented and the piglet surplus with its associated 
animal welfare problems will be reduced. As a potential consequence, IPs in a red area that are as yet 
undetected can in the alternative scenario unknowingly transport infected piglets to other farms 
(finisher farms), and thus spread the disease further. In this study, we only consider transport of live 
piglets, and all other types of transports (such as manure etc) remain under the transport ban 
according to the current contingency plans.   
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the difference between the default and the alternative scenario: under the 
default scenario the regions coloured red and yellow are subject to a piglet transport ban, whereas 
under the alternative scenario only farms located within 10 km PS-zones around detected IPs receive 
                                                          
1 The Dutch word ‘regio (van regionalisatie)’ has been translated into ‘control region’.  
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a piglet transport ban (areas coloured yellow). Figure 1.3 shows a map of commercial pig farm 
densities in The Netherlands in the year 2011.  
In this study, the additional transmission risk of a reduction of the area under piglet transport ban 
(i.e. a reduction of the areas coloured red or yellow in Figure 1.2 to only the yellow areas) will be 
quantified.  For both scenarios the risk will be expressed as the expected mean size of additional IPs 
in hitherto disease-free regions, caused by (1) transport of infected piglets from the red area to the 
green area in Figure 1.2, causing new IPs and (2) the subsequent neighbourhood infections of these 
new IPs.  
Output of this epidemiological analysis will be used for the economic analysis of the two scenarios. In 
this economic analysis the piglet surplus is calculated for both scenarios, as well as the financial costs 
and benefits difference between the two scenarios.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The 20 control regions in the Netherlands as  
defined in the Dutch CSF contingency plan (Anon., 2013).  
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Figure 1.2: Snapshot taken during a simulated CSF epidemic 
(Backer et al., 2013). Blue dots are detected IPs. Yellow 
areas denote the 10 km PS-zones around each IP. The green 
regions are assumed not to be under a piglet transport ban 
(once the initial national standstill has ceased). In the 
default scenario, red areas are under a piglet transport ban. 
In the alternative scenario, red areas are not under a piglet 
transport ban.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Map of pig farm densities in the 
Netherlands in 2011. The simulated CSF epidemics 
(Backer et al., 2013) all started in De Peel (black circle), 
a densely populated livestock area. 
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1.2 Material and Methods  
 
Modelling of the transmission risks under the default scenario 
Here we will employ the same epidemiological model as was used for the BO project ‘C-strain 
vaccination against Classical Swine Fever: effects on epidemic and final screening’ (Backer et al, 
2013). The model of Backer et al. (2013) is a spatial and stochastic individual-based model and an 
extension of a previously developed model of CSF virus transmission between animals, pens and 
farms in the Netherlands (Bergevoet et al., 2007, Backer et al., 2009).  
We will use the results of 1000 simulations where the E2-subunit vaccine was used in 2 km rings 
around detected IPs as control measure, and when 5 farms were infected in De Peel (control region 
18, see Figure 1.2 and 1.3) at the end of the High Risk Period (HRP lasting 5 weeks). The effect of the 
E2-subunit vaccine on the animal-to-animal transmission of CSFV was modelled by separate effects 
on the susceptibility, infectiousness and infectious period of a vaccinated animal. The between-herd 
transmission was modelled as a function of the distance between source- and destination herd, 
called the transmission kernel. The transmission kernel parameters were estimated from the 
1997/1998 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands (Boender et al., 2008, Backer et al., 2009, Backer et al., 
2013), so they represent the between-herd transmission still occurring during a transport ban. More 
details such as the values of input parameters for the model can be found in Backer et al. (2013). 
Table 1.1 shows the number of pig farms and their size as used in the model. Location coordinates of 
each farm were used, based on the Dutch farm location dataset of 2011 (see Figure 1.3).   
 
Table 1.1: Summary of herd size and number of premises in The Netherlands in 2011 as used in the 
simulation model (Backer et al., 2013). 
 # premises average herd size 5-95% quintiles of 
herd size 
total # of animals 
finishing herds 5688 1139 136 - 3844 6 478 796 
sow sections 2425 390 77 - 1087 945 270 
piglet sections 2629 1718 211 - 4980 4 517 123 
total 7018 1702 156 - 5636 11 941 189 
 
Upon detection of the first infected farm in the country, the EU measures will be applied: culling of 
infected premises (IP), transport regulations in protection (3 km around IP’s) and surveillance (10 km 
around IP’s) zones, as well as tracing and screening of dangerous contacts. In the model, in addition 
to the EU measures, pre-emptive culling in 1 km around IP’s will be applied during the first 5 days. 
After this period, 1 km pre-emptive culling is replaced by emergency vaccination with the E2-subunit 
vaccine in 2 km rings around IP’s. This is strategy vacE2_2km in the report of Backer et al (2013). 
 
 
 
Epidemiological evaluation 
 
9 
 
 
Additional modelling steps for the transmission risks under the alternative scenario 
For the default scenario we can directly use the output of the 1000 simulated CSF epidemics as a 
basis for evaluating the risks. For the alternative scenario this output is also used, but now as input 
for further modelling to estimate the risks arising from live piglet transports occurring in this scenario 
that are not allowed in the default scenario. Below we describe this further modelling in three steps. 
Output variables of interest are listed in Table 1.2, and their values are given in the Results section. 
Step 1: Infected farms in the red areas 
First, we use the 1000 simulated epidemics to calculate the number 𝑁farmsinfpiglets of IPs with 
infected piglets located in red areas. For an example of the red areas, see Figure 1.2. In the default 
scenario, the IPs with piglets and located in red areas are subject to a piglet transport ban. In the 
alternative scenario, these IPs are not subject to a piglet transport ban up until they become 
detected or become part of a PS zone around another IP. Thus these IPs pose a risk by potentially 
transporting infected piglets to other (finishers) farms. A related measure of risk is the cumulative 
number 𝑁cuminfdays of infectious days of these IPs until becoming detected or becoming part of a PS-
zone.    
Step 2: Transmission by piglet transport from IPs in red areas to farms elsewhere  
Just after weaning on multiplier farms, piglets are often sorted by weight to make pens of piglets 
with a uniform starting weight. By law, piglets are allowed to be mixed, but only once. After that they 
stay together. In addition, when piglets are transported, they are all sent to the same finisher farm. 
This makes it likely that infected piglets from one multiplier farm stay grouped, and therefore it 
becomes relevant to consider the destination of the whole group of infected piglets. Thus, in our 
model we assume that in the period before the IP becomes detected or becomes part of a PS-zone, 
such a group of piglets will either be transported as a whole, thereby infecting one single finisher 
farm, or not be transported, thereby infecting none.  
The probability  𝑝inf that transport of the group of infected piglets takes place can be calculated from 
the cumulative number 𝑁�infdaysperfarm of infectious days per IP in a red area and the average 
residence time 𝐷piglets  of a piglet in the weaned piglet section of a multiplier farm (i.e. the time 
between weaning and transport to a finisher farm), which is around 5 weeks. Note that if the 
frequency in which piglets are transported to finisher farms would be set to once per three weeks in 
crisis time (instead of the normal value of once a week) and all pigs would be kept on the multiplier 
farm for a minimum of 5 weeks, then the value for 𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 increases with 1 week to 6 weeks. Due to 
this longer average residence time, the value of the probability 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑓 would be lowered by 20%.  
The total number 𝑁inftransports of infected piglet transports from red areas (and thus of new IPs 
infected via piglet transport) arises from a binomial distribution with a probability of success equal to  
𝑝inf and number of draws equal to the number 𝑁farmsinfpiglets of IPs with infected piglets in red 
areas.  
 
Epidemiological evaluation 
10 
Step 3: Total number of newly infected farms outside already affected regions  
As a worst-case scenario we assume that all infected piglet transports go over long distances, 
infecting finisher farms located in areas outside the control regions already affected. We note that 
whether such a scenario is relevant depends on the question whether or not the piglet surplus could 
already be addressed by allowing piglet transports only within the red areas. This question is studied 
in Chapter 2 of this report (economic evaluation), and is important because allowing piglet transports 
from red to green areas goes against the general purpose of regionalisation.  
As a result of the worst-case scenario assumption, the number of distant infected finisher farms is 
equal to 𝑁inftransports. Before detection of these infected finisher farms, they can subsequently 
infect their neighbouring farms, a process which was modelled by the between-herd transmission 
kernel discussed above, describing all unknown transmission routes in the presence of an animal 
transport ban. We therefore call these newly infected finisher farms ‘distant seeders’. The 
distribution of the number of subsequent neighbourhood infections per distant seeder was obtained 
also from the 1000 simulated epidemics, by identifying all long jumps (of 50 km or more) in these 
epidemics and counting their subsequent neighbourhood infections.   
The total number of additional infected IPs per epidemic (𝑁add) resulting from lifting the piglet 
transport ban in the red areas  is the sum of the number of infected transports (i.e. distant seeders) 
and their number of subsequent infections. From the simulated distribution of 𝑁add we calculate the 
mean, the median and the 5% and 95% quantiles.   
 
Table 1.2: List of one parameter (𝑫𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐬) and seven output variables of interest.   
Symbol Origin Units Description 
𝐷piglets Expert knowledge days Average residence time of a weaned piglet on a multiplier farm. 
𝑁farmsinfpiglets Simulated epidemics farms Number of farms with infected piglets in the red areas. 
𝑁cuminfdays Simulated epidemics days Cumulative number of days of all farms with infected piglets in 
the red areas  per epidemic.  
𝑁�infdaysperfarm Simulated epidemics days/farm Average period that a farm contains infectious piglets in red 
areas.  
𝑝inf Simulated epidemics + 
further modelling 
-/- Probability that transport of the group of infected piglets takes 
place from an IP with infected piglets in a red area.  
𝑁inftransports Simulated epidemics + 
further modelling 
# transports Number of infected transports leaving the red areas (not the 
yellow PS zones) per epidemic.  
𝑁subseqcases Simulated epidemics farms/farm Number of subsequent infections per ‘distant seeder’.  
𝑁add Simulated epidemics + 
further modelling 
# farms Number of additional infected IPs per epidemic.  
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1.3 Results  
 
Epidemiological analysis of the default scenario 
Table 1.3 shows the results of 1000 simulated CSF epidemics, where the epidemic started in De Peel 
with 5 infected farms at the end of the HRP (Backer et al., 2013). The size of the epidemics controlled 
by 2-km ring vaccination with the E2subunit vaccine (vacE2_2km) is relevant for the present study. 
The size for the other scenarios of EU measures only (EU) and 1-km ring culling (cul_1km) are given 
as comparison. The median epidemic size for vacE2_2km is 14 detected farms, with range of 5 to 32. 
The mean size is 15.8 detected farms.   
 
Table 1.3. Simulation results of 3 control strategies EU, cul_1km and vacE2_2km: epidemic 
duration, number of detected, pre-emptively culled and vaccinated farms per CSF epidemic; 
median values and (5% - 95%) interval between brackets. 
control 
strategy 
duration* (days) 
number of detected 
farms 
number of 
preemptively culled 
farms 
number of vaccinated 
farms 
EU 202 (65 - 475) 40 (10 - 128) 0 (0 - 0) 0 (0 - 0) 
cul_1km 93 (35 - 199) 13 (5 - 27) 79 (26 - 173) 0 (0 - 0) 
vacE2_2km 113 (37 - 236) 14 (5 - 32) 8 (2 - 20) 191 (56 - 414) 
*Duration of the epidemic is defined as the time between the first and the last detection. 
 
 
Epidemiological analysis of the alternative scenario 
Also derived from the vacE2_2km simulations is the number of farms with infected piglets in the red 
areas: 𝑁farmsinfpiglets. Table 1.4 shows the Probability Density Function (PDF), i.e. the distribution of 
𝑁farmsinfpiglets in the 1000 simulated epidemics. According to this table, 52.1 % of the CSF epidemics 
in the Netherlands had no IPs with infected piglets located in the red areas at all. So in half of the 
epidemics there is no risk at all of lifting the piglet transport ban in these (red) areas. But in the other 
47.9 % of the epidemics, 1 to 6 infected farms were located in the red areas at their moment of 
infection. These farms can cause a risk. Overall,  Nfarmsinfpiglets has a mean of 0.848 farms. 
Epidemiological evaluation 
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Table 1.4: Distribution of 𝐍𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐬 over 1000 simulated CSF epidemics. 𝐍𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐩𝐢𝐠𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐬 is 
the number of farms with infected piglets in the red areas at their moment of infection.  
Distribution for Nfarmsinfpiglets 
 
value probability 
0 0.521 
1 0.268 
2 0.109 
3 0.067 
4 0.019 
5 0.011 
6 0.005 
mean = 0.848 
 
 
 
The cumulative number of infectious days of all the IPs with infected piglets in the red areas, denoted 
by 𝑁cuminfdays, is the total number of days that those farms present a risk of CSF spread via piglet 
transport. As shown in Table 1.5A, the mean value of 𝑁cuminfdays based on the 1000 vacE2_2km 
simulations is 18.4 days. To put this number into perspective, Table 1.5A also gives the mean 
cumulative number of infectious days of all IPs with infected piglets in the yellow and in the green 
areas (see Figure 1.2) in the Netherlands, as well as the corresponding quantities for IPs with infected 
finisher pigs and for IPs with infected sows. The mean value for 𝑁cuminfdays of 18.4 days is small 
compared with the much higher number of 120.9 days of IPs with infected piglets located in yellow 
areas (i.e. PS-zones) at their moment of infection. According to Table 1.5A, the mean total number of 
infectious days of IPs with infected piglets is 143.4 days, to which the PS-zones contribute 84.3%, the 
red areas 12.9%, and the green areas 2.8%. The IPs in green areas correspond to long-distance 
between-herd transmission events that are already present in the default scenario.  
 
Table 1.5A: Cumulative number of infectious days of farms with infected finishers, infected sows or 
infected piglets per epidemic: mean values in different areas.  
 Area 
Herd type PS-zone1 Red1 Green1 
Finishers 209.2 29.9 7.1 
Sows 158.1 17.5 3.6 
Piglets 120.9 18.4 4.1 
Any 481.3 65.3 14.7 
1 for these areas, see Figure 1.2 
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When considering number of infected farms (IPs, all herd types combined) instead of the number of 
infectious days of IPs with infected piglets, a comparable contribution of 85%, 12% and 2.8% is found 
for IPs located in the PS-zones, the red areas and the green areas, respectively. Data are shown in 
Table 1.5B. The first detected farm of the epidemic (first case) is not located in a PS-zone yet at the 
moment of detection.     
 
Table 1.5B: Location of detected farms (at the moment of their detection) in 1000 simulated CSF 
epidemics.  
Type Mean Median 5%-quantile 95%-quantile 
First case 1.00 1 1 1 
PS-zone1 12.64 11 3 27 
Red1 1.74 2 0 4 
Green1 0.42 0 0 2 
Whole of NL (total) 15.80 14 5 32 
1 for these areas, see Figure 1.2 
 
From Table 1.4 and Table 1.5A it was calculated that the mean number of infectious days per farm 
with infected piglets in a red area (𝑁�infdaysperfarm) is 21.7 days. Using this number and a value for 
𝐷piglets (the average residence time of weaned piglets on a multiplier farm), the probability 𝑝inf that 
a given IP with infected piglets, and located in a red area at its moment of infection, infects a finisher 
farm via piglet transport is equal to 0.62 when 𝐷piglets is 5 weeks and 0.52 when 𝐷piglets is 6 weeks. 
These residence times of 5 and 6 weeks correspond with a piglet transport frequency of once a week 
(normal value) and once per three weeks, respectively.  
As explained in the Materials and Methods section, the number of infected piglet transports 
(𝑁inftransports) leaving from IPs in red areas is binomially distributed, with probability of success 
denoted by  𝑝inf. The results for 𝑁inftransports are shown in Table 1.6. According to this table, in 
64.7% of the CSF epidemics there is no infected piglet transport from a red area at all under the 
alternative scenario, with a normal value for the piglet transport frequency of once a week. In the 
other 35.3% of the epidemics, 1 to 6 infected transports occur. The mean number of infected piglet 
transports from red areas is 0.53 per epidemic (Table 1.6).  
If all these transports are to distant (say >50 km away) finisher farms, this corresponds to a mean 
additional number of transmission jumps of more than 50 km away from the source farm of 0.53. For 
the default scenario (of a piglet transport ban in the red areas) the mean number of such long jumps 
is approximately 0.21 per epidemic (see Appendix A for details). Therefore, under the alternative 
scenario this increases from 0.21 to 0.74 per epidemic for a normal piglet transport frequency of 
once a week. 
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Table 1.6. The total number of infected transports per epidemic for different piglet transport 
frequencies. 
 Piglet transport frequency 
once per week,  
i.e. 𝐷piglets = 5 weeks Piglet transport frequency once per 3 weeks,  i.e. 𝐷piglets = 6 weeks 
 
Number of infected transports  Probability 1 Probability 2 
0 0.6470 0.6841 
1 0.2338 0.2267 
2 0.0803 0.0632 
3 0.0282 0.0197 
4 0.0082 0.0042 
5 0.0021 0.0020 
6 0.0004 0.0001 
1 Mean number of  infected transports (and thus distant seeders): 0.525  
2 Mean number of  infected transports (and thus distant seeders): 0.440 
 
 
Each infected piglet transport leads to a new IP, which is called a ‘distant seeder’. The number of 
subsequent cases per ‘distant seeder’, 𝑁subseqcases, is given in Appendix A, with mean 0.94 farms per 
‘distant seeder’. The distribution of the total number of additional infected farms per epidemic 𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑑 
obtained from the distribution of 𝑁inftransports and that of 𝑁subseqcases, is characterized in Table 1.7. 
For 𝐷piglets = 5 weeks, the mean total number of additional IPs per epidemic equals 1.01, with 5% 
and 95% quantiles being  0 and 5, respectively. In 64.7% of the CSF epidemics there is no additional 
infected farm at all when lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas. In another 16.5 % of the 
epidemics 1 additional infected farm occurs and in the other 18.8 % more than 1 additional infected 
farm occurs.  For 𝐷piglets = 6 weeks, the mean total number of additional IPs per epidemic equals 
0.84, with 5% and 95% quantiles being 0 and 4, respectively. (The fact that the value of 
𝑁farmsinfpiglets in Table 1.3 is also 0.84 is a pure coincidence).    
As a summary, Table 1.8 shows the mean estimates of all relevant output variables. Table 1.9 shows 
a summary of results comparing the default transport ban scenario to the alternative scenario, for a 
piglet transport frequency of once a week. 
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Table 1.7. Distribution of the total number of additional infected farms (IPs) per epidemic, resulting 
from lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas, at different piglet transport frequencies.  
 Piglet transport 
frequency once per week,  
i.e. 𝐷piglets = 5 weeks Piglet transport frequency once per 3 weeks,  i.e. 𝐷piglets = 6 weeks 
 
Total number 𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑑 of additional IPs 
(distant seeders + subsequent IPs)  
Probability 1 Probability 2 
0 0.647 0.684 
1 0.165 0.160 
2 0.068 0.059 
3 0.038 0.032 
4 0.024 0.020 
5 0.015 0.012 
>5 0.042 0.033 
1 Mean number of  additional IPs: 1.01  
2 Mean number of  additional IPs: 0.84 
 
Table 1.8: Mean estimates of relevant output variables. When two values are given, the first value 
corresponds to a piglet transport frequency of once per week, and the second to a piglet transport 
frequency of once per 3 weeks.  
Symbol Origin Mean value Units Description 
𝑁farmsinfpiglets Simulated epidemics 0.848 days Average residence time of a weaned piglet on a multiplier 
farm. 
𝑁cuminfdays Simulated epidemics 18.4 farms Number of farms with infected piglets in the red areas. 
𝑁�infdaysperfarm Simulated epidemics 21.7 days Cumulative number of days of all farms with infected 
piglets in the red areas  per epidemic.  
𝑝inf Simulated epidemics 
+ further modelling 
0.62 or 0.52 days/farm Average period that a farm contains infectious piglets in 
red areas.  
𝑁inftransports Simulated epidemics 
+ further modelling 
0.53 or 0.44 -/- Probability that transport of the group of infected piglets 
takes place from an IP with infected piglets in a red area.  
𝑁subseqcases Simulated epidemics 0.94 # transports Number of infected transports leaving the red areas (not 
the yellow PS zones) per epidemic.  
𝑁add Simulated epidemics 
+ further modelling 
1.01 or 0.84 farms/farm Number of subsequent infections per ‘distant seeder’.  
 
Table 1.9: Summary of results comparing the default transport ban scenario to the alternative 
scenario. Only results for a piglet transport frequency of once per week are given. 
Symbol Default: 
no transport of 
piglets in red 
areas 
 
Mean value 
Alternative: 
piglet transports 
allowed in red 
areas 
 
Mean value 
Units Description 
     
𝑁𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 0 0.53 # transports Number of infected piglet transports leaving the red 
areas per epidemic (=number of distant seeders).  
# jumps (>50 km) 0.21 1 0.74 2 farms Farms infected by source farms > 50 km away per 
epidemic 
     
𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑑  0 1.01 farms Number of additional infected farms per epidemic, due 
to piglet transport in red areas.  
     
Total epidemic size 15.8 16.8 farms Number of detected farms per epidemic 
     
1 See Table A in Appendix A: 208 jumps of >50 km were observed in 1000 simulated epidemics.  
2 Calculated as the sum of 0.21 (default number of jumps) and 0.53 (number of distant seeders due to piglet transport in red areas).  
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Extra control measure: screening of all multiplier farms in the red areas, before piglet transport 
takes place to finisher farms. 
 
To reduce the probability that an infected piglet transport takes place (i.e. to reduce pinf), each 
multiplier farm can be screened shortly before transport of the piglets to another farm. Screening 
can take place (shortly before piglet transport) by visual inspection of piglets, or by a PCR test. Table 
1.10 shows the number of farms with piglets located in the red areas during a CSF epidemic, 
according to simulations of Backer et al. (2013), and the corresponding number of farms to be 
screened per working day, when all farms with piglets located in the red areas (second column of 
Table 1.10) are screened within a period of one week.  
 
 
Table 1.10: Number of farms with piglets located in the red areas in 1000 simulated CSF epidemics;  
mean values and (5% - 95%) interval between brackets.   
Week since first 
detection 
Number of farms with piglets located 
in the red areas  
Number of farms with piglets to be 
screened per working day 
0 163 (139-181) 32.6 (27.8-36.2) 
2 194 (143-291) 38.9 (28.6-58.2) 
4 261 (172-401) 52.2 (34.4-80.2) 
8 359 (211-542) 71.8 (42.2-108.6) 
16 449 (242-689) 89.8 (48.4-137.9) 
32 480 (245-754) 96.0 (49.0-150.8) 
48 482 (245-758) 96.4 (49.0-151.6) 
54 482 (245-758) 96.4 (49.0-151.6) 
 
 
Table 1.10 shows that the number of farms with piglets in the red areas continues to increase during 
the epidemic. This is due to the fact that red areas remain their red status during the epidemic, and 
they are not declared free from infection (i.e. become green) until the final screening, which in the 
model takes place at the end of the epidemic. In reality, red areas can be declared free from infection 
earlier during the epidemic, 42 days after the last detection in that region. This decision is, however, 
a political one, which cannot be simulated by the model. Furthermore, the figures of Table 1.10 
during the first 8 weeks of the epidemic are not affected by this, as that is too early for declaring 
areas free from infection.   
Nevertheless, Table 1.10 shows that the number of farms to be screened (before their piglet 
transport) is very high, with mean values varying from 30-70 farms per working day during the first 8 
weeks of the epidemic.   
 
 
 
 
  
Epidemiological evaluation 
 
17 
 
1.4 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Infected farms in the red areas 
 
According to our model simulations, about half of the CSF epidemics in the Netherlands have no farm 
with infected piglets located in the red areas at all. But in the other half of the epidemics, 1 to 6 
farms with infected piglets were located in the red areas at their moment of infection. These farms 
can cause a risk when the piglet transport ban in these areas is lifted. Overall, the mean number of 
farms with infected piglets in the red areas is 0.85 farms per epidemic. This number of infected farms 
(0.85) causes 18.4 emission-days in the red areas, which is 13% of the total number of emission-days 
caused by farms with infected piglets before detection in the whole country. Most of the emission-
days (84%) are caused by farms located in the PS-zones, where a standstill was already implemented.   
 
Transmission by piglet transport from IPs in red areas to farms outside these regions 
With a normal value for piglet transport frequency of once a week, in 65% of the CSF epidemics there 
is no infected transport at all, when lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas. In the other 35% 
of the epidemics, 1 to 6 infected transports occur in the country. The mean number of infected 
transports in the country is 0.53 per epidemic, causing the same number of farms (0.53) infected by 
piglet transport.  
 
Total number of newly infected farms outside the red areas  
With a normal piglet transport frequency of once a week, in 65% of the CSF epidemics there is no 
additional infected farm at all, when lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas. In another 16.5% 
of the epidemics, 1 additional infected farm occurs and in the other 18.8% more than 1 additional 
infected farm occurs. The total number of additional infected farms per epidemic has a mean value 
of 1.01 farms (with median value 0), when the normal frequency of one piglet transport per week is 
applied. This reduces to a mean of 0.84 farms (with median value 0) at a lower frequency of one per 
three weeks. 
The estimated numbers of additional infected farms must be compared to the mean epidemic size of 
CSF in the Netherlands under the default scenario, which is 15.8 infected farms according to Backer 
et al. (2013). So due to lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas, the mean increase of the CSF 
epidemic size by 1.01 farms (at one piglet transport per week) represents an increase of 6.4%. This 
reduces to 5.3% at a lower piglet transport frequency of one per three weeks. 
Additional to looking at the increase in total epidemic size, we can compare the number of 
transmission jumps in the country during an epidemic. The mean number of jumps more than 50 km 
away from the source farm increases from 0.21 under the default scenario to 0.74 per epidemic 
under the alternative scenario (with a normal piglet transport frequency of one per week). In other 
words, this number increases by a factor 3.5 when lifting the piglet transport ban in the red areas. 
However, the value of 0.74 jumps can be reduced by transporting piglets from farms in red areas as 
much as possible to farms in the same red areas (i.e. not to green areas further away).  
 
Epidemiological evaluation 
18 
Screening of all multiplier farms in the red areas before piglet transport takes place to finisher 
farms. 
 
The number of farms with piglets located in the red areas to be screened (before their piglet 
transport) is very high, with mean values varying from 30-70 farms per working day during the first 8 
weeks of the epidemic. This number increases to 96 farms per working day at later stages of the 
epidemic, if red areas are not declared free from infection.  
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Appendix A. The number of subsequent IPs per distant seeder 
 
The number of subsequent IPs per distant seeder is given in Table A, and was obtained from the 
simulated epidemics of Backer et al. (2013). In 1000 simulated epidemics, 208 long jumps were 
observed (i.e. long distance jumps of between-herd transmission of  50 km or more), corresponding 
to a mean number of 0.208 long jumps per epidemic. These long jumps in CSF transmission are 
possible because of the tail of the between-herd transmission kernel: there is still a small (but not 0) 
probability of getting infected at long distances from a source farm. Of these 208 distant seeders, 
147 farms (being 70.7 %) did not infect any of their neighbouring farms, so their number of 
secondary cases was 0. The other 29.3% of the distant seeders did infect neighbouring farms, the 
number varying between 1 and 14 (see Table A). 
 
Table A: Distribution of 𝐍𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐞𝐪𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐬. 𝐍𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐞𝐪𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐬 is the total number of subsequent infected 
farms per distant seeder. A long jump is a between-herd transmission jump of 50 km or 
more.  
 
Number of secondary 
cases per long jump 
Absolute number of jumps Probability 
0 147 0.706731 
1 25 0.120192 
2 13 0.062500 
3 8 0.038462 
4 4 0.019231 
5 2 0.009615 
6 0 0.000000 
7 1 0.004808 
8 2 0.009615 
9 1 0.004808 
10 1 0.004808 
11 1 0.004808 
12 
13 
0 
1 
0.000000 
0.004808 
14 2 0.009615 
 208 1.000000 
Mean number of subsequent IPs caused per distant seeder (long distance infection) is 
0.9375. 
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Chapter 2. Economic analysis of the piglet surplus 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Pig farming is a highly specialized in the Netherlands. Breeding, multiplication and fattening are 
usually carried out on separate farms. Only a relatively small fraction of farms combine different 
phases on one location (i.e., closed farms). Movement of animals between different farms is an often 
occurring event because of this highly specialized production. Furthermore, a large number of piglets 
are exported from the Netherlands to other EU Member States since fattening of slaughter pigs is an 
activity increasingly performed outside the Netherlands.  
Movement restrictions are a vital part of contingency plans. The spread of CSF or FMD after 
introduction in a country is reduced by implementing severe movement restrictions for farms that 
might be at risk of being infected. However, transport restrictions during CSF or FMD epidemics will 
likely lead to overstocking since pig farmers only have limited possibilities to house extra animals as 
may be necessary during movement bans. Moreover, movement restriction will also lead to a piglet 
surplus problem, not only on affected farms, but also on other farms given the relative large number 
of piglets produced in the Netherlands .  
Reducing the area under transport ban is likely to ease the surplus problem, improve animal welfare 
and decrease financial costs during an outbreak of CSF or FMD in the Netherlands. Easing transport 
bans in affected regions is expected to reduce specific costing components of an outbreak since 
density of sow farms and fattening pig farms are highly correlated (Figure 2.1). 
However reducing the area under transport ban might have consequences for the course of the 
epidemic as well. In the previous section the epidemiological impact of easing transport bans during 
an CSF epidemic in the Netherlands is quantified. The risk assessment focused on the transmission of 
the virus via piglet transport from infected piglets to other farms and regions.  
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Figure 2.1: Density of sow farms (left) and fattening pig farms (right). Borders of 20 control regions are depicted and units 
are in SO 2.  
 
In this section the potential impact of reducing the area under transport ban is quantified in terms of 
costs (e.g., incurred costs because of increased transmission risk) and benefits (e.g., reduction of 
piglet surplus). Therefore the objective of this part of the research was to evaluate the economic 
impact of different transport ban strategies. This can contribute to the decision making process of 
policy makers in government and sector. The following three sub-objectives are identified:  
1. Determining the extent of piglet surplus in the different areas during a CSF outbreak; 
2. Evaluating strategies  to manage the surplus of piglets; 
3. Economic evaluation of reducing the area under transport ban. 
 
 
  
                                                          
2 SO is the standard revenue in euro’s used as an indicator of farm size. Average SO for sow farms in the 
Netherlands amounts 704,000 euro (BINternet, raming 2012) ad 390,000 euro per fattening pig farm 
(BINternet, raming 2012). Corresponding herd size amounts 555 sows and 1545 fattening pigs respectively. 
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2.2 Material and Methods 
 
Movement restrictions  
The Dutch contingency plan prescribes a movement ban of all livestock for a period of 72 hours in the 
whole country after the first notification of CSF. All susceptible animals on Infected Premises (IP) are 
culled. A PS-zone is established in the combined area of the Surveillance zone (“Toezichtsgebied”) of 
10 km around an IP, which encapsulates the Protection zone (“Beschermingsgebied”) of 3 km around 
the same IP. The rest of the country will be divided into infected areas and free areas. For the 
present study, two areas that are distinguished during an outbreak are of interest, namely:  
A) Areas in infected regions but outside the 10 km PS-zone of an IP (hence referred to 
as infected areas); and  
B) Not affected areas.  
Infected areas are those areas/regions in which a PS is present.  The rest is considered to be a free 
area. In principle no movement of pigs is allowed in both infected and free areas. However 
movement bans of pigs might be lifted after permission by the Competent Authorities. This 
permission will be given only after careful evaluation of the outbreak situation. In free areas 
restrictive measures will most likely be lifted earlier than in infected areas. In our calculations we 
assume that transport in the free areas from fattening farms to slaughter houses and from breeding 
farms to fattening farms is allowed rather soon after the onset of the outbreak. For infected areas we 
consider two situations: a) in the default situation we assume that in the infected areas no transport 
is allowed; and b) in the alternative situation in the infected areas (except PS) transport from 
fattening farms to slaughter houses and from breeding farms to fattening farms of piglets is allowed. 
In the contingency plan it is foreseen that within infected areas slaughtering of infected animals is 
possible. However it is not clear at which stage this is allowed and if and when transport from 
breeding to fattening farms is allowed.  Hence the two alternative scenarios.  
Figure 2.2A illustrates the default scenario of regions which are confronted with an animal transport 
ban (coloured red and yellow) when outbreaks are detected in three specific control regions 8, 18 
and 19. Figure 2.2B illustrates the alternative scenario where only farms located within 10 km PS-
zones around detected IPs are confronted with a transport ban (coloured yellow) and the absence of 
a transport ban for the rest of the regions. In both the default and alternative scenario all farms 
within a PS-zone are under the transport ban.  
 
In this study, the additional transmission risk of a reduction of the area under transport ban (a 
reduction of the area coloured red + yellow in Figure 2.2A to only yellow in Figure 2.2B) will be 
quantified.  The risk will be expressed as the expected mean size of additional IPs in formerly disease-
free regions, caused by  (1) unknown transport of infected piglets from the red area to the green 
area in Figure 2.2 and (2) the subsequent neighbourhood infections of these new IPs. Per area the 
number of farms with piglets, sows, and fattening pigs are summarised on a weekly basis until the 
end of outbreak (Backer et al., 2013). For this, we will use the output of 10.000 simulated CSF 
epidemics in the Netherlands of Backer et al. (2013), where 2 km ring vaccination with the E2 subunit 
vaccine was used as control measure.  
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Figure 2.2A: Default scenario. Blue dots are detected IPs. 
Yellow disks denote the 10 km PS-zones around each IP. 
Outbreaks in control regions 8, 18 and 19 cause a transport 
ban in the northern control regions 4, 5 and 8 and in the 
southern regions 17, 18 and 19. The green regions are not 
under a transport ban. 
Figure 2.2B: Alternative scenario. Blue dots are detected 
IPs. Yellow disks denote the 10 km PS-zones around each IP. 
Only the yellow regions (PS-zones) are placed under a 
transport ban. The green regions are not placed under a 
transport ban. 
 
 
Extent of piglet surplus in the different areas and management strategies 
In the present study, the extent of piglet surplus during a CSF outbreak is determined per 
investigated area.  This surplus is based on weekly difference in piglet production and fattening pigs 
delivered for slaughtering. Average herd size is 390 sows. The average number of piglets produced 
per sow per year is set at 25 and this results in a piglet production of 188 piglets/week/sow farm. The 
average herd size on a fattening farm is 1136 and with a fattening period is 115 days (3.18 
production cycles per fattening pig place of 1m2) there are 69.5 pigs/week ready for slaughter . These 
input values together with the number of breeding and fattening farms in the different areas were 
used to calculate on a weekly basis piglet production in a region and the number of slaughter pigs 
that are ready for slaughter.  
To manage the surplus of piglets three options  are analysed: 
a. Allowing transport within areas (i.e., within infected areas); 
b. Additional measures:  
b1. Higher stocking density by reducing the space per fattening pig (10% or 30% 
increased stocking density instead of  0.8m2 (default); 
b2. More pigs fattened per year per place by lowering slaughter weight by reducing 
the fattening period to 100 days instead of  115 days (default). 
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Note that the maximum allowed stocking density is depending on average weight of a pen; for the 
range of 30-50 kg, 50-85 kg, 85-110 kg and above 110 kg the area per pig should be at least 0.5m2, 
0.65m2, 0.80m2 and 1.00m2 respectively. 
 
Economic evaluation of reducing the area under transport ban 
Given the objective of the study only the differences in economic consequences between the 
different strategies were evaluated. To evaluate the economic consequences of the different 
strategies an existing economic model is used (Backer et al., 2009). This model is based on partial 
budgeting. In partial budgeting only those costs and benefits that are expected to differ substantially 
between alternatives are included. Given the main objective of this research, to compare the effects 
of different strategies, this evaluation method is appropriate. Price data of 2012 were used. In case 
no recent data are available (e.g. because some cost can only be determined after an outbreak) they 
are based on historical data indexed for a price level of 2012. For this indexation price indexes of CBS 
were used. Bergevoet and van Asseldonk (2013) estimated that the average cost of an outbreak of 
CSF in the Netherlands in which vaccination with a E2 subunit vaccine in an area of 2 km around an 
infected farms will cost around 45 million Euro (excluding enforcement, welfare culling and export 
losses) given an average of 14 infected farms as estimated by Backer et al. (2013).  
Additional costs and cost foregone are the two main additional components in the current partial 
budget to evaluate differences between a strategy with a transport ban and a strategy without an 
transport ban in infected areas (outside PS area). 
The first component of additional cost stems from the risk of increased control costs because of  
larger expected outbreaks. Increased control costs comprise culling and the potential risk of 
establishing new PS’s and vaccination areas. The average costs per (extra) infected farm will amount 
3.4 million Euro (Bergevoet and van Asseldonk, 2012).  
The second component of additional costs comprises extra enforcement costs. Enforcement costs 
are costs related to police involvement and other control agencies to ensure compliance with the 
movement restrictions an execution of regulations. The enforcement costs are likely to be different 
between the strategies since it affects the risk that an area outside the PS zone might become 
infected. However, they are difficult to estimate, since they depend on the location of the outbreaks, 
enforcement deemed necessary by the competent authorities and the expected cooperation of 
farmers in the affected areas. Enforcement costs are mainly affected by the duration of the outbreak 
and are often substantial. In previous outbreaks enforcement costs were estimated to be as high as 
335,000 Euro per day (Bergevoet et al, 2012). Although less precise, in the current analysis we 
specified the enforcement costs by the size of the outbreak (2.7 million Euro per infected farm). 
The third component of additional costs comprises logistic slaughter costs and the associated 
reduced revenues due to suboptimal value creation. It is assumed that in the situation in which the 
transport ban is eased within infected areas (except PS area) it is possible to transport fattening pigs 
to slaughter houses (one origin per transport). Idle fattening pig places are stocked with piglets from 
breeding farms within the area (one origin per transport). Logistic slaughter costs and suboptimal 
value creation in infected areas are comparable to the value loss of vaccinating animals (which need 
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to be logistically slaughtered as well) and amount 0.44 Euro per kg (Bergevoet et al 2007). The total 
volume affected depends on the number of animals slaughtered in the infected areas during the 
outbreak.  
The first component of cost foregone arise from abandoning culling and destruction of piglets and 
the second component results from abandoning culling and destruction of fattening pigs. 
Alternatively, within the partial budget approach additional benefits could be accounted for in term 
of extra revenues of piglet sales and finishing pig sales instead of accounted for costs forgone.  
With a transport ban welfare problems will arise after a while. During the CSF outbreak in 1997/1998 
an extensive welfare culling programme was implemented. Welfare culling is a term used to describe 
the culling of animals because of overcrowding or other deteriorating animal husbandry conditions 
on farms placed under movement restriction. The current contingency plan does not foresee such 
programme so it is unlikely that a welfare culling programme will be applied to such extend as in the 
past. However, in the current default situation we include costs associated with welfare culling and 
thus accounting for the overall costs (but do not address whether these costs are borne by the sector 
or government).  
It is assumed that animals under the welfare culling programme are destroyed and rendered 
(Meuwissen et al., 2003). Welfare slaughter generally refers to animals that are ready to be delivered 
(farrowing farm: 23 kg piglets; other types of farms: 116.9 kg fattening pigs). Cost foregone 
comprises expenses for killing and destruction as well as the market value of the animal. Accounted 
foregone costs are assumed to amount to 56 Euro and 147 Euro per piglet and fattening pig 
respectively (Meuwissen et al., 2003). The total volume affected depends on the number of piglets 
and fattening pigs in the infected areas during the outbreak. Note if meat under the welfare culling 
programme is allowed to enter the food chain logistic slaughter costs and the associated reduced 
revenues due to suboptimal value creation need to be accounted for.  
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2.3 Results 
 
Determining the extent of piglet surplus in the different areas during a CSF outbreak 
The number of piglets produced in each area depends on the number of sow farms. The extent of 
piglet surplus in each area subsequently depends on whether or not transport is allowed from 
fattening farms to the slaughter house and between farrowing farms and finishing farms. Current 
analysis is based on the spatial model of Backer et al. (2013) in which the number of sow sections 
and piglet sections amounted 2425 and 2629 respectively. Average herd size amounted to 390 sows 
and 1718 piglets (see Table 1.1, section Epidemiological evaluation).  
The total number of piglets produced increases linearly over time in all areas (Figure 2.3). The 
average number of piglets produced in infected areas (outside the 10 km PS-zone of infected 
premises) amounted 2.22 million after 119 days. For ease of interpretation only outcomes for this 
time period are presented because it approximately equals the average duration to produce 
fattening pigs. A wide variation in the number of piglets produced in areas with transport bans was 
observed as presented in terms of the 5% percentile and 95% percentile values. The average number 
of piglets produced in areas without transport bans amounted approximately 4.12 million after 119 
days. 
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative number of piglets of 25kg per week in infected areas (above) and free areas (below).  Solid line 
represents average, dashed lines represent 5% and 95% percentile values.  
 
In the epidemiological model of Backer et al. (2013) the total number piglets present amounted 4.52 
million (assuming 0.945 million sows). Given these characteristics the annual production of piglets 
inside the 10 km PS-zone of an infected premises, in the infected areas and free areas was on 
average 4.52 million piglets, 6 million piglets and 12 million piglets respectively. Although the 
majority of the piglets are domestically fattened, the average number of piglets exported is 
approximately 6.9 million per year (Westra, 2013). 
To determine the national piglet surplus besides domestic supply (i.e., piglets produced) also 
domestic demand (i.e., size of fattening pig production) need to be quantified. In the epidemiological 
model of Backer et al. (2013) 5688 fattening pig herds were included, with an average herd size of 
1139 fattening pigs (see Table 1.1, section Epidemiological evaluation).  
As a result of the simulated CSF outbreak and transport ban control strategy the number of places 
with ready to slaughter pigs will increase over time in infected regions but outside the 10 km PS-zone 
of an IP. In case only transport of fattening pigs to the slaughter house but no transport of piglets to 
fattening farms is allowed, all fattening pigs are slaughtered 119 days after transport ban 
commenced (Figure 2.4). The average number of idle fattening pig places after 119 days amounted to 
approximately 2 million, although a wide variation was observed as presented in terms of the 5% 
percentile and 95% percentile values. The average number of fattening pig places in areas without 
transport bans exceeded 3 million. 
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative number of fattening pigs per week in infected areas (above) and free areas (below).  Solid line 
represents average values, dashed lines represent 5% and 95% percentile values. 
 
In the epidemiological model of Backer et al. (2013) the total number of fattening pigs present 
amounted 6.5 million. The average number of fattening pigs in inside the 10 km PS-zone of an IP was 
on average 1.5 million (total animals 6.5 million minus 2 million in infected areas minus 3 million in 
free areas). 
 
Evaluating strategies to manage the surplus of piglets. 
 
In the current contingency plan piglet transport to fattening farms in not allowed in affected regions 
(i.e., infected areas). Allowing transport in affected regions will reduce piglet surplus considerably. In 
Figure 2.5 idle places refer to the availability of fattening pig places for piglets, while in the case of a 
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surplus this option is not feasible. On average supply balances demands, however in 5% of the 
outbreaks piglet surplus will exceed 0.28 million after 119 days.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Cumulative number of piglet surplus per category per week in infected areas (above) and free areas (below). 
Solid line represents average, dashed lines represent 5% and 95% percentile values. 
 
Note that piglet surplus in regions without transport bans is still existing. Allowing transport between 
both areas will on average not reduce domestic piglet surplus since the annual number of piglets 
exported is approximately 6.9 million (Westra, 2013), but because idle places are minimised the 
surplus is not increased. 
If besides allowing transport in red zone also permitted stocking density is temporarily increased with 
10% or 30% supply will exceed demand in both areas of interest (Figure 2.6). However, increased 
stocking density will raise welfare concerns, especially at high slaughter weights of fattening pigs.  
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Figure 2.6: Cumulative piglet surplus for default situation, and increased stocking density with 10% or 30% (above) and free 
areas (below). Solid line represents average values, dashed lines represent 5% and 95% percentile values. 
 
An alternative or even complementary option is to allow transport in infected zones while fattening 
pigs are slaughtered at lower weights (resulting in a fattening period of 100 days versus 115 days). 
Ultimately, this will increase demand for piglets in the zones and reduce piglet surplus (Figure 2.7).  
However there are number of issues that will hamper adoption of the latter strategy. Lower 
slaughter weights will reduce profit margins per fattening place. Moreover, slaughter capacity might 
become a constrained. Note that The Dutch pig meat production is an open system with considerable 
import and export of live fattening pigs (and meat).  
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Figure 2.7: Cumulative piglet surplus for default situation  and 15 days shortened fattening period in infected areas (above) 
and free areas (below). Solid line represents average, dashed lines represent 5% and 95% percentile values. 
 
Economic evaluation of reducing the area under transport ban 
The additional costs and cost foregone in the partial budget model depends on the estimated 
epidemic outcomes. The mean number of detected farms per epidemic in the default situation is 
15.8 and this increases to 16.8 in case additional movement of animals in infected areas is allowed. 
The number of animals produced in the infected areas is elaborated on in the previous section. In 
summary, the average number of piglets ready for markets and pigs ready for slaughter amounts 7.7 
million and 2.2 million respectively (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: Number of animals produced in infected areas (million animals). 
 Infected areas 
  Percentile 
  Average 5% 95% 
Piglets ready for market 7.7 4.7 10.6 
Pigs ready for slaughter 2.2 1.5 2.9 
 
The increased control costs and enforcement costs given the strategy to ease the transport ban is 
derived by accounting for the additional costs per extra farm detected. The additional outbreak costs 
amount 3.4 million Euro, while extra enforcement costs amount 2.7 million Euro (Table 2.2). 
Compared to other costing components the relative impact of an increased outbreak size is less 
relevant.  
The economic losses due to reduced revenues in infected areas (channelling and suboptimal value 
amount on average 115.2 million Euro) are offset by the foregone costs of culling and destructing 
valuable products (on average 434.3 million Euro and 329.2 million Euro for piglets and fattening pigs 
respectively) in case welfare culling is foreseen.  
 
Table 2.2: Economic evaluation of reducing the area under transport ban (million Euro). 
 Average Percentile 
   5% 95% 
Additional costs    
Increased control costs 3.4 - - 
Extra enforcement costs 2.7   
Logistic slaughtering and suboptimal value creation 115.2 74.6 149.2 
Costs foregone: Welfare culling and no breeding ban    
Culling and destruction piglets 434.3 262.8 600.1 
Culling and destruction fattening pigs 329.2 213.1 426.2 
 
The estimated amounts for channelling and suboptimal value as well as for culling and destructing 
valuable products are substantial. Meuwissen et al., (2003) estimated in the most likely CSF scenario 
for the southern region that welfare slaughter would cost 94 million Euro. However, their control 
strategy included a breeding prohibition 4 weeks after the onset of an epidemic (Meuwissen et al., 
2003). A breeding prohibition was also declared during the CSF outbreak in 1997/1998. In the current 
simulation study  the epidemiological impact and associated costs of a breeding prohibition are not 
estimated . Moreover, it is unlikely that a welfare culling programme will be applied to such extend 
as quantified.  
  
Economic evaluation 
 
34 
2.4 Discussion and conclusions  
 
Model simulations revealed that the average number of piglets produced in infected areas but 
outside the 10 km PS-zone of infected premises amounted to 2.22 million after 119 days (given an 
outbreak in three specific regions 8, 18 and 19). Allowing transport in affected regions will reduce 
piglet surplus considerably. On average supply balances demands, however in 5% of the outbreaks 
piglet surplus will exceed 0.28 million after 119 days. If besides allowing transport also permitted 
stocking density is temporarily increased (with 10% or 30%) or fattening period shortened (from 115 
days to 100 days) supply will exceed demand in areas of interest.  
Easing the transport ban would increase the risk of transmission (i.e., larger outbreaks) thereby 
increasing control and enforcement costs by 6.1 million Euro. Compared to other costing 
components the relative impact of an increased outbreak size is less relevant. The economic losses 
due to reduced revenues in infected areas (i.e., channelling and suboptimal value) are offset by the 
foregone costs of culling and destructing valuable products (i.e., welfare slaughter programme). 
Besides easing transport regulation additional control measures can be taken to limit the additional 
risk of transmission. For example screening of all piglets transported within the infected area might 
be considered as well.  
In the current analyses less tangible benefits are not accounted for. For example the reduced animal 
welfare problem and impact of public opinion are difficult to ascertain but are important issues 
favouring to ease transport bans. Another important issue to address is the impact of the chosen 
transport strategy on export. As a result of an epidemic, national and international market access for 
animals of susceptible species and their products is restricted. After the last outbreak it takes at least 
6 weeks until the first movement restrictions are lifted. However, it can take up to 6 months until all 
trade restrictions in the EU are lifted. The Netherlands is a net exporting country of piglets and meat. 
The export losses might differ between the strategies, but the extent is unclear.  Additional trade 
losses might be incurred due to loss of confidence of trade partners and especially when an outbreak 
occurs in previously free areas as a result of piglet transport.  
In summary, allowing transport between infected areas and free areas will on average not reduce 
domestic piglet surplus since the annual number of piglets exported is approximately 6.9 million 
(Westra, 2013). But allowing transport in affected regions will reduce local piglet surplus 
considerably.    
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